分类： 记录生活

。昨天椿哥开租的吉利电车来了晚上8:40才到家我做了一桌子菜也没吃几囗就回宾馆休息了早上6:30我去迎宾馆订了早歺吃完8:30分回洛阳了晚上6:00才到家给我姑1000元红包设要

往常一天也就20次攻击。今天有490个，有史以来最高。我觉得这个网站没什么意义，关了两天。今天打开发现玩命攻击我。你想想大网站的攻击量得是多少？

人从哪里来？死了去哪里？来世上干什么？

人生一世，首先感谢老祖宗，再珍惜人世间的亲情友情，这就是人生。那一年，承蒙老家的鸿宾一家、二伯伯家的姐姐接待，踏上父親魂牵梦绕的故乡，闻到了刘氏家族上百年生于斯繁于斯的血脉气息。然而，我目睹我爷爷奶奶故去后的栖息之处淹没在一片荗密的玉米地旁，且与旁边的土丘混为一处几乎没有差异时，惊悸、感叹，这就是繁衍，这就是我的归去？

我可能是唯物主义者，也从我父母那儿领悟了厚养薄葬的谆谆教诲(我上面的三个姐姐一个哥哥，对我爸爸妈妈的暮年及骨灰的安置有各自的理解，目前，重庆著名的华岩寺那儿存放我父親的骨灰已有25年，母亲的骨灰也近10年)。即或他们幸存的儿女想着去把墓位管理费续缴二、三十年。可我和姐姐哥哥们离开人世后，谁会在意这件事呢？有一句哲言:能记得你的，不会超过第三代。

所以，我准备像我的二姨、姨父那样(他们一家都是军人，二姨参加抗美援朝，姨父是副军级职务离休，啊，彻底的唯物主义者)。他们的孩子也尊从老人的意愿，不买墓地，直接将骨灰洒进大海(周恩来也是这样)。活着就好好活，死了不拖累任何人，，，

这一些告知与你，也和你的感悟一样，活好当下！

2026-2-19~22在天津和悠然町玩了三整天，22号上午8:40高铁967次返回沧州。逛了国家海洋博物馆，大悦城，海河景观天津之眼……在家吃了烤牛排、涮羊肉……养的金毛大犬金–“端午”太吓人。

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配车库遥控钥匙两个90元

腊月十四孙姐Care休息.买豆腐鸡蛋万年青.两个饼.做了白菜粉条豆腐.青菜鸡蛋.豆浆机打粥.晚8点开车接内弟、9点30分才接到、送回家、老妹打电话说老爸不高兴了，因为我说过年不回去的事一唉

As of late January 2026, the Chinese military (primarily the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA) is engaged in routine but intensive activities focused on training, modernization, and maintaining pressure in key hotspots like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. Here’s a breakdown of the most recent and prominent developments based on open sources:

Ongoing Annual Training Cycle

The PLA kicked off its 2026 annual training season in early January, with large-scale, combat-oriented drills across all branches (Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Armed Police). These emphasize:

• Joint operations
• Real-combat scenarios
• Use of advanced systems like J-20 stealth fighters, DF-17 hypersonic missiles, Type 055 destroyers, unmanned systems (drones, robotic dogs), and live-fire exercises

This is standard start-of-year activity but conducted with high intensity to build readiness.

Routine training continues, including:

• Submarine operations
• Naval aviation arrested landings
• Jet trainer flights
• Peacekeeping force inspections (e.g., in Lebanon)

Activities Around Taiwan

The PLA maintains persistent military pressure through near-daily incursions and patrols:

• Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense regularly reports PLA aircraft (typically 2–4 sorties per day recently) and PLAN vessels (around 5) operating around the island, plus occasional balloons.
• A notable escalation occurred in mid-January: A PLA WZ-7 surveillance drone flew through Taiwanese airspace over Pratas (Dongsha) Island — possibly the first confirmed violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace in decades. China described it as “normal training” near “China’s Dongsha Island.”
• Late 2025 saw major exercises like Justice Mission-2025, which rehearsed blockades, live-fire strikes, and port seizures around Taiwan. While no equivalent large-scale drill has been reported in January 2026 yet, the pattern of “joint combat readiness patrols” continues as a new normal.

Taiwan has responded with its own drills, including spring exercises simulating defense against sea assaults using missiles, drones, and patrol boats.

South China Sea and Broader Naval Activity

• PLA Navy ships have been active, including transits through the First Island Chain (pushing into the Western Pacific).
• Recent operations included a joint rescue of a capsized foreign cargo ship near Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal).
• Troops on South China Sea islands (e.g., Nansha) conducted multi-domain combat drills.
• There’s ongoing use of maritime militia (fishing vessels in coordinated formations) to assert presence in contested waters like the East China Sea.

Internal Developments and Purges

A major story dominating coverage is Xi Jinping’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign within the military:

• Gen. Zhang Youxia (vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and once seen as close to Xi) is under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law” — potentially including corruption or even leaking nuclear secrets.
• This is part of a broader purge (multiple generals and officials removed in recent years), which analysts say consolidates Xi’s control but creates some turmoil in leadership.
• Official Chinese sources insist the PLA grows stronger through these efforts, with no major impact on readiness reported.

Other diplomatic/military notes include:

• Defense minister video talks with Russia
• PLA aerobatic team (J-10 jets) participating in the Singapore Airshow

Overall, there’s no indication of imminent large-scale conflict or unusual mobilization beyond the norm. The PLA is in a phase of sustained high readiness, modernization pushes, and gray-zone pressure (especially toward Taiwan), while dealing with internal purges. Activities are consistent with long-term goals of becoming a “world-class” military by mid-century.